Neoteronous
A Modern Man Standing in the Tradition of Catholic Platonism
A Modern Man Standing in the Tradition of Catholic Platonism
Tuesday, March 14, 2006
One of the biggest problems with philosophy since the time of Locke is that very few philosophers believe in intellectual intuition. Most assume that intuition is limited to outer and inner sense, i.e., sensation and feelings, and the few who do believe in intellectual intuition, like Hegel and Leibniz(?), are pretty weird people. Hegel's influence, moreover, is limited by the fact that he is well nigh unintelligible even to intellectuals. I once sat in on the class of a famous and old professor who said that he had spent years studying Hegel, and had known some famous Hegel scholars, and he said, "I never met anyone who could explain to me one paragraph of Hegel's Logic." Thankfully, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, at least, is intelligible given enough effort and time.
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Bonaventure all believed in intellectual intuition. And so did Descartes. Descartes epistemology, if not his methodology, is in many ways more akin to ancient and medieval epistemology than to modern and post-modern epistemology.
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One of the biggest problems with philosophy since the time of Locke is that very few philosophers believe in intellectual intuition. Most assume that intuition is limited to outer and inner sense, i.e., sensation and feelings, and the few who do believe in intellectual intuition, like Hegel and Leibniz(?), are pretty weird people. Hegel's influence, moreover, is limited by the fact that he is well nigh unintelligible even to intellectuals. I once sat in on the class of a famous and old professor who said that he had spent years studying Hegel, and had known some famous Hegel scholars, and he said, "I never met anyone who could explain to me one paragraph of Hegel's Logic." Thankfully, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, at least, is intelligible given enough effort and time.
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Bonaventure all believed in intellectual intuition. And so did Descartes. Descartes epistemology, if not his methodology, is in many ways more akin to ancient and medieval epistemology than to modern and post-modern epistemology.
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Comments:
This is right: when we loose "nous" or "mens" or "intellectus" we are left with only the discursive reason- but it is a discursive reason that neither has a sure place to start, nor a sure place to end. Man start to see the infinity of his reasoning having that infinity characteristic of hell: one vacuous assertion after another, without beginning nor end, except though an equally vacuous assertion of our own will.
This makes a good deal of sense of thought after Descartes: which is always characterized by "having to start all over again" with some act of the will (remember Descares divinization of the will "as will I perceive that it is not different from God?") Philosophy since Descartes has been one continual attempt to start philosophizing. Over time, we even forgot that we needed to start with something.
# posted by
shulamite : 12:19 PM
This makes a good deal of sense of thought after Descartes: which is always characterized by "having to start all over again" with some act of the will (remember Descares divinization of the will "as will I perceive that it is not different from God?") Philosophy since Descartes has been one continual attempt to start philosophizing. Over time, we even forgot that we needed to start with something.
# posted by
shulamite : 12:19 PM
There remains, of course, the danger of nominalism -- something of a temptation when cognitio intuitiva is emphasized too heavily, or admired to greatly, at discursive (by which I mean abtractive, principled as such in the operation of the operation of the intellectus agens) reason's expense. So at least we may consistently interpret the post- and anti-Scotus epistemological and metaphysical movements of Ockham. But there is some sense in which it is true that, in an act of intuitive cognition, something is apprehended as both universal and particular, without which unified reception (though I am, and may forever be, unclear as to the exact mechanism) neither epistemology nor metaphysics is possible.
And as always there is the confirming descensus: are you familiar with Charles Williams' literary-romantic interpretation of 'theotokos'?
# posted by
: 5:35 PM
And as always there is the confirming descensus: are you familiar with Charles Williams' literary-romantic interpretation of 'theotokos'?
# posted by
: 5:35 PM
I myself don't believe in an agent intellect, but by intellectual intuition, I was including what would be for Thomas or Bonaventure the first act of the agent intellect, which could be called abstraction. I am not very familiar with Scotus' or Ockham's epistemologies, (which I hope to rectify,) but from what Scotus I have read, I would think that if he has an agent intellect, its activity would be an intellectual intuition as well. As far as Ockham goes, I would presume that a nominalist would believe in only sensuous intuition, and thus would either drop the agent intellect altogether, or would mean something very different by it than an Aquinas or Bonaventure would.
Emphasizing intuitive cognition can only lead to nominalism when one understands by intuitive cognition sensuous intuition only, which is why empiricism is so close to nominalism.
Intellectual intuition, unlike sensuous intuition, can intuit the universal, the essence, though I believe it can also intuit the individual, the haecceity.
I have not read Williams' work.
# posted by Neoteronous : 9:12 PM
Emphasizing intuitive cognition can only lead to nominalism when one understands by intuitive cognition sensuous intuition only, which is why empiricism is so close to nominalism.
Intellectual intuition, unlike sensuous intuition, can intuit the universal, the essence, though I believe it can also intuit the individual, the haecceity.
I have not read Williams' work.
# posted by
Neoteronous : 9:12 PM
I'm not clear how you're simultaneously (a) including the first act of the agent intellect, and (b) subsuming cognition of haecceities, under the name 'intellectual intuition'..?
But again, which is the object of intellectual intuition: the universal, or the essence (or, alternatively and perhaps concomitantly, the individual, or haecceity)? The question is crucial because a determinate act can't take both an essence and an haecceity as formal object, since the two are formal terms defined exclusively. But a determinate act could (prima facie) take a universal and a particular (I'm hesitant to use 'individuum' non-technically) as object, since they formally disagree but are not formal terms themselves. This is precisely what I think intuitive cognition does -- viz., takes universal and particular concomitantly as object, and not only concomitantly, but under the same ratio; though this Ratio be indeed simply the univocal Logos.
In slightly different phrases I think, roughly, that human beings are only capable of intelligence (and, implicitly, intellectual intuition, or intellection of any kind) because, precisely, the Word is made flesh; because it is not possible, save by the union of the universal and the particular under a single common Ratio, that anything should be understood to be what it is both in itself and in relation to others (i.e., both in absolute and in relative being); and, further, that all this is analogically true in the (as it were) 'Willenswelt': i.e., that there is analogy between knowledge of X in itself and in relation to others, and love of X in itself and in relation to others, exactly described by the distinction between unqualifiedly universal Christian charity and impossibly particular conjugal -- or else, in statu viatoris, religious-consecrated -- love.
# posted by : 5:20 PM
But again, which is the object of intellectual intuition: the universal, or the essence (or, alternatively and perhaps concomitantly, the individual, or haecceity)? The question is crucial because a determinate act can't take both an essence and an haecceity as formal object, since the two are formal terms defined exclusively. But a determinate act could (prima facie) take a universal and a particular (I'm hesitant to use 'individuum' non-technically) as object, since they formally disagree but are not formal terms themselves. This is precisely what I think intuitive cognition does -- viz., takes universal and particular concomitantly as object, and not only concomitantly, but under the same ratio; though this Ratio be indeed simply the univocal Logos.
In slightly different phrases I think, roughly, that human beings are only capable of intelligence (and, implicitly, intellectual intuition, or intellection of any kind) because, precisely, the Word is made flesh; because it is not possible, save by the union of the universal and the particular under a single common Ratio, that anything should be understood to be what it is both in itself and in relation to others (i.e., both in absolute and in relative being); and, further, that all this is analogically true in the (as it were) 'Willenswelt': i.e., that there is analogy between knowledge of X in itself and in relation to others, and love of X in itself and in relation to others, exactly described by the distinction between unqualifiedly universal Christian charity and impossibly particular conjugal -- or else, in statu viatoris, religious-consecrated -- love.
# posted by
: 5:20 PM
I myself don't believe in an agent intellect, but the role that it plays, in a Thomistic system, (the one I am most familiar with,) is that it intuits the meaning of terms in its first act, i.e., it grasps the essences of things. It only later composes and divides and syllogises, or reasons discursively. In the Thomistic system there is, of course, no intellectual intuition of haecceities. Particularity can only be sensed.
On my understanding, (although it is still in flux,) our passive intellect intuits the haecceity of that which is before us, and contuits its essence by contuiting the Eternal Exemplars in the Divine Mind. The extent and nature of this contuition is still a question to me. However, as any haecceity bears an inherent reference to its Eternal Exemplar, a single faculty has both the haecceity and the essence, the Divine Idea, as its object. Intellect in fact could not grasp the haecceity without contuiting the Idea.
I'm intrigued as to your claim that intelligence is only possible because the Word became flesh. How would this work? Was there no intelligence before the Incarnation?
# posted by Neoteronous : 9:32 AM
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On my understanding, (although it is still in flux,) our passive intellect intuits the haecceity of that which is before us, and contuits its essence by contuiting the Eternal Exemplars in the Divine Mind. The extent and nature of this contuition is still a question to me. However, as any haecceity bears an inherent reference to its Eternal Exemplar, a single faculty has both the haecceity and the essence, the Divine Idea, as its object. Intellect in fact could not grasp the haecceity without contuiting the Idea.
I'm intrigued as to your claim that intelligence is only possible because the Word became flesh. How would this work? Was there no intelligence before the Incarnation?
# posted by
Neoteronous : 9:32 AM
