Neoteronous
A Modern Man Standing in the Tradition of Catholic Platonism
A Modern Man Standing in the Tradition of Catholic Platonism
Sunday, March 19, 2006
I argued back in January on this blog that all beings in time have an internal duality: they exist both as receiving themselves from time prior and as giving themselves to the future. At the moment of death, a man is both alive and dead, though not in the same respect. He is alive as received from the past, and dead as giving to the future. From this an argument can be drawn to prove the finitude of time past, although I doubt I will do it justice now.
Given that a being, in the very moment it exists, even in the 'now', exists in one respect as receiving from the past, it exists as an effect of some cause, and specifically of some temporal cause, of the way things were in the past. The state of affairs in the past cannot be the only cause of the way things are in the present, for then there could be no free-will, nevertheless, all temporal beings essentially bear the characteristic of being effects of the past.
Every determined effect is the effect of a determinate cause. But every past moment, if it also has a time prior to it, is also a determined effect of the time before it. But a determined effect cannot be caused by a determined cause ad infinitum, for then nothing would have the determinacy which is derivatively in all the determined effects. There must, therefore, be a determinate moment in the past, which is not determined itself, at least not determined in a temporal fashion as the others are. If this is the case, it cannot have a time prior to it. Thus the world must have a temporal beginning.
To put it another way, if every moment is receiving from the past, it is receiving something. But if every moment is receiving, then where does that which is received come from? It obviously cannot come from the moments which are receiving. But that which is received is received as coming from the past. There must, therefore, be some past moment which is not receiving, but is itself the cause of that which is being received by every other moment. If there was no first moment, no temporal beginning to the world, there would be no such moment. There must, therefore, be a first moment to the world.
The fact that that which is received is not the same thing every moment, but something different each moment, does not alter the argument. For although each (middle) moment determines what is received by the following moments, it only determines as modifying what it itself received. It's determining is determined by its receiving (in the case of free agents, only partially determined.) It does not provide the determination for the future, but modifies the determination which the past provides. It cannot be the case that every moment only modifies the determinacy passed on, for then there would be no source of the determinacy which is modified. Yet the determinacy is received, i.e., it is essentially an effect, and thus must have a source. Moreover, it is received essentially from the past, and thus has essentially a source in the past. There must, then, be a moment which has a determinacy which essentially and in its entirety is not received from the past, which would mean a moment that had no past. Once again, there must be a temporal beginning to the world.
It should be fairly easy to conclude from all this that there must be a non-temporal, an eternal being to provide this initial determinacy, for we cannot conceive of a moment as self-constituting, as not having a cause. If there must be a moment with no past, no temporal cause, it must have a non-temporal cause. Every cause is prior to its effect; this non-temporal cause, must then, be prior to its effect in a non-temporal, metaphysical way. This being all men call God.
If it be objected that God determines and causes things at every moment, and did not initiate the world and then leave it be, one must first note that God's existence is granted, and thus the previous argument should be convincing to one who does not believe in God's existence. Secondly, however, when God acts on the world in each and every moment, causing its existence, he does not do so in such a way that he robs the world of its temporality. He lets secondary causes operate according to their own nature, and temporal causes according to their own nature, which requires a beginning moment. God holds all things in existence, and is the necessary condition each and every moment for their being as they are, but he still allows things to be determined by their past, and still makes the determination which the present gives to the future be determined, fully or partially, by the determination which it received from the past. If this were not the case, God would have to essentially re-create the world at every moment, and things would only seemingly be determined by the past, and not really. In this case, every moment would in fact be a first moment, a temporal beginning and the argument, although in a distorted way, would still hold.
Update: This argument is based on the supposition that never more than a moment exists. Time does not exist, on this understanding, as an extended whole, only the 'now' ever exists. On the other supposition, that time does exists as an extended whole, the argument is more simple and goes as follows:
If there was no temporal beginning to the world, then there is an infinite amount of time past. However, per the obvious nature of temporal existence, we are only at the moment we are at now, because all the time before us has passed. An infinite amount of time cannot have passed, however, for the infinite by definition cannot be traversed. If therefore, there were no temporal beginning to the world, we would not be at the moment we are at now, or at any determinate moment. But we are at the present moment, therefore the world has a temporal beginning.
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I argued back in January on this blog that all beings in time have an internal duality: they exist both as receiving themselves from time prior and as giving themselves to the future. At the moment of death, a man is both alive and dead, though not in the same respect. He is alive as received from the past, and dead as giving to the future. From this an argument can be drawn to prove the finitude of time past, although I doubt I will do it justice now.
Given that a being, in the very moment it exists, even in the 'now', exists in one respect as receiving from the past, it exists as an effect of some cause, and specifically of some temporal cause, of the way things were in the past. The state of affairs in the past cannot be the only cause of the way things are in the present, for then there could be no free-will, nevertheless, all temporal beings essentially bear the characteristic of being effects of the past.
Every determined effect is the effect of a determinate cause. But every past moment, if it also has a time prior to it, is also a determined effect of the time before it. But a determined effect cannot be caused by a determined cause ad infinitum, for then nothing would have the determinacy which is derivatively in all the determined effects. There must, therefore, be a determinate moment in the past, which is not determined itself, at least not determined in a temporal fashion as the others are. If this is the case, it cannot have a time prior to it. Thus the world must have a temporal beginning.
To put it another way, if every moment is receiving from the past, it is receiving something. But if every moment is receiving, then where does that which is received come from? It obviously cannot come from the moments which are receiving. But that which is received is received as coming from the past. There must, therefore, be some past moment which is not receiving, but is itself the cause of that which is being received by every other moment. If there was no first moment, no temporal beginning to the world, there would be no such moment. There must, therefore, be a first moment to the world.
The fact that that which is received is not the same thing every moment, but something different each moment, does not alter the argument. For although each (middle) moment determines what is received by the following moments, it only determines as modifying what it itself received. It's determining is determined by its receiving (in the case of free agents, only partially determined.) It does not provide the determination for the future, but modifies the determination which the past provides. It cannot be the case that every moment only modifies the determinacy passed on, for then there would be no source of the determinacy which is modified. Yet the determinacy is received, i.e., it is essentially an effect, and thus must have a source. Moreover, it is received essentially from the past, and thus has essentially a source in the past. There must, then, be a moment which has a determinacy which essentially and in its entirety is not received from the past, which would mean a moment that had no past. Once again, there must be a temporal beginning to the world.
It should be fairly easy to conclude from all this that there must be a non-temporal, an eternal being to provide this initial determinacy, for we cannot conceive of a moment as self-constituting, as not having a cause. If there must be a moment with no past, no temporal cause, it must have a non-temporal cause. Every cause is prior to its effect; this non-temporal cause, must then, be prior to its effect in a non-temporal, metaphysical way. This being all men call God.
If it be objected that God determines and causes things at every moment, and did not initiate the world and then leave it be, one must first note that God's existence is granted, and thus the previous argument should be convincing to one who does not believe in God's existence. Secondly, however, when God acts on the world in each and every moment, causing its existence, he does not do so in such a way that he robs the world of its temporality. He lets secondary causes operate according to their own nature, and temporal causes according to their own nature, which requires a beginning moment. God holds all things in existence, and is the necessary condition each and every moment for their being as they are, but he still allows things to be determined by their past, and still makes the determination which the present gives to the future be determined, fully or partially, by the determination which it received from the past. If this were not the case, God would have to essentially re-create the world at every moment, and things would only seemingly be determined by the past, and not really. In this case, every moment would in fact be a first moment, a temporal beginning and the argument, although in a distorted way, would still hold.
Update: This argument is based on the supposition that never more than a moment exists. Time does not exist, on this understanding, as an extended whole, only the 'now' ever exists. On the other supposition, that time does exists as an extended whole, the argument is more simple and goes as follows:
If there was no temporal beginning to the world, then there is an infinite amount of time past. However, per the obvious nature of temporal existence, we are only at the moment we are at now, because all the time before us has passed. An infinite amount of time cannot have passed, however, for the infinite by definition cannot be traversed. If therefore, there were no temporal beginning to the world, we would not be at the moment we are at now, or at any determinate moment. But we are at the present moment, therefore the world has a temporal beginning.
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Comments on this understanding of time and eternity
1) you say that every moment is receiving something from the past. I am not sure this is a correct definition of a moment. It is true that in the Aristotelian sense, every moment is the end of the past and the beginning of the future (and thus time is continuous). However, this doesn't mean that something is handed on to the moment FROM the past. A moment is the endpoint of time. As an analogy, suppose you have line AC, with point B in the middle, dividing the line into lines AB and BC (sorry blogging doesn't let me draw it). Point B is the end of line AB and the beginning of line BC. But you don't say that line AB has a CAUSAL connection to line BC. Simply, it leaves off where the second line starts. Neither, I argue, can you say that point B receives something from line AB. If anything, it contributes an endpoint to line AB.
In the same way, all of motion as such is continous -yet we can identify individual motions within the general flow of motion(something like the boundary problems you were identifying in January postings). One billiard ball strikes another, and where the first one stops, the second one starts - the entire motion is continuous, but there are two separate motions involved, one for each ball, which are continuous with each other. Here you can say that the first motion is the cause of the second.
Time, however, is a function of motion. So in this restricted scenario the time of the whole motion can be broken down into two parts, between which there is a moment which is the endpoint of the first time and the beginning of the time. Again I argue there is no causal connection here. Although motion1 causes motion2, time1 is simply the measure of motion1, NOT the cause of time2. Causality does not follow from posteriority. Space is analogous here - if you say that time1 causes time2, you would have to say that the 1 inch distance covered by motion1 causes the 1 inch distance covered by motion2. Again, one motion causes the other, but the times simply measure the motions.
# posted by
Quaerens_Sapientiam : 10:52 PM
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1) you say that every moment is receiving something from the past. I am not sure this is a correct definition of a moment. It is true that in the Aristotelian sense, every moment is the end of the past and the beginning of the future (and thus time is continuous). However, this doesn't mean that something is handed on to the moment FROM the past. A moment is the endpoint of time. As an analogy, suppose you have line AC, with point B in the middle, dividing the line into lines AB and BC (sorry blogging doesn't let me draw it). Point B is the end of line AB and the beginning of line BC. But you don't say that line AB has a CAUSAL connection to line BC. Simply, it leaves off where the second line starts. Neither, I argue, can you say that point B receives something from line AB. If anything, it contributes an endpoint to line AB.
In the same way, all of motion as such is continous -yet we can identify individual motions within the general flow of motion(something like the boundary problems you were identifying in January postings). One billiard ball strikes another, and where the first one stops, the second one starts - the entire motion is continuous, but there are two separate motions involved, one for each ball, which are continuous with each other. Here you can say that the first motion is the cause of the second.
Time, however, is a function of motion. So in this restricted scenario the time of the whole motion can be broken down into two parts, between which there is a moment which is the endpoint of the first time and the beginning of the time. Again I argue there is no causal connection here. Although motion1 causes motion2, time1 is simply the measure of motion1, NOT the cause of time2. Causality does not follow from posteriority. Space is analogous here - if you say that time1 causes time2, you would have to say that the 1 inch distance covered by motion1 causes the 1 inch distance covered by motion2. Again, one motion causes the other, but the times simply measure the motions.
# posted by
Quaerens_Sapientiam : 10:52 PM
